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Low Expectations, High Growth:
The Economy and Reform in 1987
Penelope B. Prime
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The political roller coaster China rode in 1987 also proved unsettling 
for the economic reforms. Assurances that the reforms would con­
tinue and the appointment of Zhao Ziyang to replace Hu Yaobang as 
the Party general secretary gave little solace initially. Following Hu's 
resignation, expectations concerning the acceleration, or even the 
maintenance, of China's reform program fell. Major reform initiatives 
such as the proposed bankruptcy law were put on hold. Debate en­
sued over the effect on socialism of separating management from 
ownership, decreasing the role of the Party and ministries in enter­
prise operations, altering relative prices through price reform, and al­
lowing income inequalities to widen. Periodic attacks by Party conser­
vatives on influential intellectuals who had openly expressed their 
liberal ideas added to the atmosphere of uncertainty. By year's end, 
however, hints of the compromises reached at the Party retreat held 
in Beidaihe in August were confirmed by a strong pro-reform stance 
taken at the Thirteenth Party Congress held in October. Reform had 
won the day, although the victory had not been easy.
In the midst of uncertainties concerning the future of reform, the 
economy began to exhibit serious macroeconomic imbalances. Eco­
nomic growth was steady at the start of 1987, and then it began to 
take off.1 By mid-year, accelerating growth was accompanied by infla­
tion and over-investment in some sectors, causing the government to 
re-impose price and investment controls. Ironically, although the con­
tinuation of economic reforms was endorsed by the Thirteenth Party 
Congress, the strains of macroeconomic imbalances may now stand in 
the way of their implementation.
1 Unless otherwise noted, statistics on China's economic performance are from Beijing 
Review; Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS), China Daily Report, and Xinhua.
19
20 Penelope B. Prime
China's experiment with a wide variety of changes in economic pol­
icy and the economic system, collectively referred to as economic re­
form, has been going on since 1979. Compared with the economic 
system in place before 1979, many of these reforms represent radical 
shifts in the levels of decision making and the use of incentives. 
Changes were often implemented first on a trial basis in one region, 
city, or group of enterprises. If the trial reform proved to be success­
ful, then the central economic offices encouraged general implementa­
tion. Also, rather than trying too many changes at once, the Party has 
introduced reforms gradually. Because of this approach, however, 
compatibility and uniformity have been lacking during this transi­
tional period, and this has allowed the process of implementation to 
disrupt the overall balance of the economy.
Such disruption serves as ammunition for political conflict over 
both the implementation process and the reforms themselves. Al­
though most of the resulting problems in the economy are due to the 
nature of the transition and not to the fact that particular reforms are 
necessarily failing, and despite the fact that the problems are tempo­
rary, they create pressure for retreat. This pressure comes both from 
people unsympathetic to the reform effort and from those who favor 
changes in the process to ease the economic dislocations and thereby 
to prevent the reforms from being abandoned altogether. The overall 
goal of the reforms is to replace administrative controls with a system 
that utilizes indirect influences over the economy such as price and 
tax incentives. When imbalances result, the most expedient solution is 
to reimpose administrative controls. Such controls, however, are di­
rectly opposite to the goal of reform, and once imposed, they are not 
easily removed. For example, between 1980 and 1982 and again in 
1985, administrative measures put in place in response to shortages, 
inflation, and domestic and international deficits took precedence over 
reform.
Economic Growth in 1987
Many of these same imbalances were again problematic in 1987. In­
flation was higher than in 1986, shortages of food emerged, and 
over-investment in some sectors continued to occur—all familiar prob­
lems in past periods when the economy "overheated." In addition, 
state revenues continued to decline as a proportion of national income 
as a result of the reforms. At mid-year national government revenues 
were 1.7 percent below planned levels.
However, two important results of the reforms countered the imbal­
ances: a near-record grain harvest and a reduction in the trade deficit.
The harvest reached 402 million tons, representing a 2.8 percent in­
crease over 1986 and second only to the record harvest of 405 tons in 
1984. By promoting exports and restricting imports, China ended 1987 
with a trade deficit of $3.5 billion after two years of substantially 
larger deficits. Both the good harvest and the improved trade balance 
will give China some maneuverability in 1988 to deal with the ten­
sions resulting from imbalanced growth. A good harvest ensures 
plentiful food supplies to urban workers without necessitating grain 
imports, and it provides fodder for other food production such as 
meat and dairy products. The improved trade balance means central 
officials can consider easing restrictions on capital imports to upgrade 
technology and lessen the demand for domestic inputs.
Looking more closely at individual sectors, we see evidence of both 
growth and imbalance. Growth by definition improves the supply 
side of the economy. At the same time, if growth of complementary 
goods is uneven, quality is poor, or demand grows faster than sup­
ply, then imbalances both within and between sectors emerge despite 
the apparently healthy growth rates. Rapid growth exacerbates these 
problems when they exist.
In industry, growth rates were higher in 1987 than in 1986, but not 
as high as in 1985, when China experienced its fastest growth rates 
since the reforms began. In the first six months of 1985, for example, 
industrial production had increased 24 percent. Many analysts and of­
ficials in China viewed such a high rate with alarm. They feared such 
high growth would cause serious imbalances and put the reform pro­
gram in jeopardy. Government controls to slow growth were imposed 
at the time, with the result that average industrial growth for the year 
fell to 18 percent. Relatively slower growth followed in 1986, with an 
annual average of 11.1 percent. Then in 1987 industrial growth began 
to accelerate once again, reaching 16 percent by mid-year with no 
signs of slowing in the third quarter. At this point Chinese officials 
were concerned that a repeat of the much-too-rapid growth of 1985 
was possible and that perhaps this problem of overheating was not 
actually temporary in nature.2 In September control measures were in­
stituted that curtailed credit and investment spending. These mea­
sures seem to have been effective. By the end of 1987 the annual 
growth rate was down to 14.5 percent.
Rural industry grew more rapidly than industry overall, with the 
gross value of industrial output increasing 19 percent to reach 450 bil­
lion yuan ($120.97 billion3). If rural industry is included in the indus­
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2 Far Eastern Economic Review, October 29, 1987, pp. 76-78.
1 using an exchange rate of 3.72 yuan per U.S. dollar.
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trial growth figures, then the gross value of industrial output in­
creased 16.5 percent for the year, reaching 1,378 billion yuan ($370.43 
billion). Steel production reached 56 million tons, an increase of 7.7 
percent over 1986. Heavy industry increased at approximately the 
same rate as light industry after a number of years of lagging growth. 
However, growth in energy (much needed) was mixed. Annual in­
creases in electricity were respectable at 12.3 percent, reaching 500 bil­
lion kilowatt hours, but coal output increased only 1.93 percent to 900 
million tons, and crude oil increased only 3.3 percent to 135 million 
tons.
In agriculture, 1987 saw substantial improvements over 1986. Since 
1986 was a relatively poor year, however, these increases are not as 
impressive as they first appear. As with grain, both cotton and oil 
crops had fallen in 1986 but regained in 1987; cotton increased 10 per­
cent after falling 14.6 percent in 1986, and oil crops increased 12 per­
cent after falling 6.4 percent in 1986. The number of cattle and sheep 
increased in 1987, but the number of pigs was down, contributing to 
shortages of pork in urban areas.
Commerce and services generally have received a tremendous boost 
with the post-1978 reforms. In 1987 this trend continued with an in­
crease of 17.5 percent in retail sales, or a 9.7 percent increase when 
inflation is taken into account. Leading the way were increases in 
sales of household items and food. Wholesale business also increased. 
In 1987 purchases by state commerce departments and supply and 
marketing cooperatives increased 18.6 percent over 1986. These aggre­
gate figures, however, obscure the fact that supply has fallen seri­
ously behind with respect to goods in high demand such as color tele­
visions, refrigerators, certain textiles, and high-quality goods in 
general. The shortage of pork, for example, was a shortage in the bet­
ter cuts of pork, not of pork per se.
Combined increases in wages and credit led to major increases in 
demand. On average, real wages increased 1.3 percent in urban areas 
and 3.3 percent in rural areas. While increases in demand due to 
these real-wage increases alone may have been manageable, addi­
tional demand due to credit expansion was not. Credit to rural areas 
was particularly generous. In the first eight months of 1987 loans out­
standing from rural banks and credit cooperatives increased to 285.68 
billion yuan ($76.80 billion), an 8.9 percent increase over the same pe­
riod in 1986. Credit to rural industry increased almost 40 percent, and 
loans for farm production were up over 78 percent. Low-interest loans 
to poor rural areas also increased substantially. Not surprisingly, 
tighter monetary controls have been proposed for 1988. These in­
creases in credit allowed rapid increases in spending by enterprises,
institutions, and other social organizations. In 1987, as in the last 
three years, this component of demand increased faster than private 
consumer spending. Despite high spending, bank saving deposits in­
creased an annual average of 38.7 percent compared with 1986. These 
deposits represent latent demand that if spent would have increased 
demand pressures in 1987; they now will be a consideration in esti­
mates for future supply needs.
Current Problems
Despite the fact that the worst fears of overheating did not come to 
pass, imbalances clearly persisted. Several current problems that re­
late to, and in some cases exacerbate, these imbalances are the 
long-term prospects for improvements in grain production, inflation, 
misguided investment, and poor performance by state industry.
The agricultural sector has continued to be hampered by a slowing 
of productivity and of output increases in grain production. The good 
harvest of 1987 was welcomed, but many are concerned about the 
long-run trend. Increases in investment in the agricultural sector are 
one solution, and there was some improvement here in 1987. Sales of 
agricultural capital goods were up 22.4 percent over 1986. But grain 
prices are low relative to many cash crops, and fertilizer prices have 
been rising. Chinese analysts argue that these trends have discour­
aged expansion of grain production. Other problems that have serious 
long-term consequences are the worsening fertility and erosion of 
land, decreases in land devoted to agriculture, inadequate infrastruc­
ture, and a lack of organizations serving agriculture.
Grain prices may have been stable, but the average price level was 
not. After an official inflation rate of 6 percent in 1986, inflation con­
tinued to rise in 1987, albeit modestly, to an official rate of 7 percent. 
Although not a high rate by other countries' standards, it causes con­
cern in China, especially because the official rate is often too optimis­
tic, and Western analysts estimate the inflation rate to be closer to 15 
percent. Even the more optimistic official figure for average increases 
in urban retail prices is over 10 percent, and for some foods it is as 
high as 35 percent. As a result, by the end of the year, after two years 
of decontrolled meat distribution, pork was again being rationed in 
Beijing, Shanghai, and Tianjin, and sugar was being rationed in Beij­
ing. Reflecting concern that the problem may worsen, in October 
China began a nationwide investigation into possible illegal price 
rises, underpayment of taxes, and profiteering.
Rapid increases in investment in 1987 contributed to the govern­
ment's problems with inflation and macro imbalance. Investment in­
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creased in energy, transportation, and irrigation, all-important sectors 
where it was badly needed. However, overall investment increased 
much more than was called for by the plan. When total investment 
exceeds planned levels it contributes to shortages of materials, adds 
inflationary pressure, and slows completion of all projects. In addi­
tion, excess investment is typically a result of relatively small, 
non-priority projects. Approximately 90 percent of the new invest­
ment projects started in 1987 entailed investments of less than a mil­
lion yuan ($0.26 million). Although these projects are small, the sums 
involved add up. At mid-year, fixed asset investment in state-owned 
enterprises alone, that is, not including collective and private invest­
ment, had increased 21 percent more than during the same period of 
1986, and capital-construction investment had increased 19.3 percent. 
In response to the over-ambitious mid-year investment levels, the 
state cancelled or postponed a number of projects, managing to re­
duce the increases in fixed assets to 14.2 percent for the year and to 
13.9 percent in capital-construction investment. While these cuts suc­
cessfully slowed investment growth, it is likely that they dispropor­
tionately affected major planned state projects, projects over which 
the government has the most control. Total investment, including 
state, collective, and private projects increased 16.5 percent, reaching 
351.8 billion yuan ($94.57 billion). While this annual increase in total 
investment was lower than the 18.7 increase in 1986, Chinese officials 
still consider it to be too high.
Another major problem area for China's economy in recent years 
has been the poor performance overall of state enterprises. For a 
number of years output growth and profit levels of state-owned enter­
prises have increased much slower than those of the collective sector. 
In industry, for example, in the first half of 1987 industrial output of 
state enterprises increased 10.2 percent over the same period of 1987, 
while collective industrial output increased 22.9 percent.4 In 1986 state 
industrial output increased only 6.2 percent, while collective industrial 
output increased 16.7 percent.
Before 1979 collectives were at a disadvantage relative to state enter­
prises. Because they were only secondary to the state plan, collectives 
often had difficulty obtaining inputs, financing, and sales at fixed 
prices. While state enterprises were covered by the plan, the collective 
sector was expected to decline as socialism advanced, and therefore 
its survival was not a priority. In the post-1978 period of reform, 
however, the state sector's previous advantages in access to inputs, fi­
nancing, and guaranteed sales has been eroded as markets have
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4 Far Eastern Economic Review, August 6, 1987, p. 52.
increasingly supplemented the plan. Flexibility in output mix, input 
sources, and pricing have become crucial to an enterprise's ability to 
respond to changing market conditions, and while collective enter­
prises have proven adaptable, state enterprises have little experience 
in such matters. Meanwhile, planners continue to rely on state enter­
prises to guarantee a minimum production level for important goods. 
Once planned output levels have been met, enterprises are supposed 
to use their excess capacity profitably. Managers of state enterprises 
who are neither used to making their way in markets nor given ade­
quate reign to do so, face a difficult task: state enterprises now serve 
as the last remaining pillar of the old planned system, but simulta­
neously must meet the demands of a new, semi-market system that is 
the product of piecemeal reforms.
The problems facing state enterprises are severe. Their profits are 
often squeezed as they purchase inputs at high market prices but sell 
their output to the state at relatively low, fixed prices. In the case of 
steel, for example, the state price is 800 yuan per ton compared with 
a market price of 1,500 yuan or more. Because inputs supplied by the 
plan are usually inadequate even to produce the planned portion of 
output, sales of the above-plan output at higher, market prices often 
are inadequate to cover rising input costs. Furthermore, enterprises 
are under pressure from workers to raise wages since wages have 
risen elsewhere in the economy. As of September the wage bill of 
state enterprises had increased 16.7 percent, contributing to increased 
costs of production. Inflation, of course, exacerbates these problems. 
The result is an incentive, albeit illegal, to under-fulfill the state plan, 
selling as much output as possible for higher, market prices.
Another problem facing state enterprises is that despite the fact that 
managers have been given more decision-making power in principle, 
in practice managers have not had much leeway to decide output 
mix, to hire or fire, or to implement linkages between remuneration 
and worker performance. When managers decide to break with past 
practices they take the risk, for example, of angering workers or en­
dangering relatively secure supply arrangements. The incentives are 
not high enough to encourage managers to take the risks involved in 
trying new production or management methods. For example, man­
agers who earn incomes that are high relative to those of the workers 
are either criticized in the press or subject to regulations limiting earn­
ings differentials. While this may not deter all managers, such criti­
cism and regulations will tend to keep the differentials small and to 
add to the uncertainty of where such reforms will ultimately lead po­
litically.
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Reform in 1987: Proposals and Progress
China's post-1978 reform program began in the agricultural sector. 
In recent years the focus of reform has moved to industry, and in 
1987, to state industrial enterprises in particular. Attempts to improve 
incentives and to increase connections between sectors have also been 
made through taxation and pricing changes. All of these reforms have 
been aided by an accepted retreat from socialized production. For ex­
ample, in agriculture families now contract directly with the govern­
ment to sell their output in return for using land, rather than working 
with other households in collectivized production. Small, privately 
run commercial and service enterprises have been allowed to increase 
rapidly. As of June 1987, the private sector accounted for 82.7 percent 
of the commercial and service businesses and handled 13.2 percent of 
the total retail volume. Collective enterprises have also made a come­
back and are now encouraged to compete with state and private en­
terprises. China's official position is that multiple forms of ownership 
are valuable—and inevitable—while China is in its current stage of 
primitive socialism. This interpretation was solidified at the Thirteenth 
Party Congress in October.
In addition to encouraging different forms of ownership, another 
principle of reform allows for the separation of ownership and man­
agement. This separation is crucial to reform in agriculture, for exam­
ple; although all land is state-owned, individual families now are 
making decisions concerning the use of land. In state industry this 
approach is necessary because if managers are to have autonomy in 
economic decision making, the input of Party officials and economic 
ministries overseeing the enterprises must be lessened. Several issues 
concerning the progress of reform in 1987 are best understood in this 
context.
The Separation of Ownership and Management
Four categories of reforms that were important in 1987 further sepa­
rate management from ownership. These are manager responsibility, 
issues surrounding enterprise funds, enterprise sales of stocks and 
bonds, and land sales. These will be discussed in turn.
At the beginning of 1987, 40 percent of state-owned enterprises re­
portedly were using a manager-responsibility system. Throughout 
1987 the other 60 percent were encouraged to do the same. In the 
context of China's attempts to reform, manager responsibility refers to 
a shift in decision making from state planners to managers of state 
enterprises. This system is designed to expand managers' flexibility in 
running an enterprise, and it is also a way to lessen Party involve-
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merit in the daily operations of enterprises and to provide incentives 
to increase production while reducing costs. Managers' performance 
is evaluated by a committee made up of members of an enterprise's 
Party committee, trade union, and worker congress. This evaluation is 
based on performance indicators such as improvements in productiv­
ity and profitability and the firm's ability to meet its contracts. Man­
agers' salary increases are then tied to these performance criteria.
In theory, manager responsibility is essential as more of the econ­
omy becomes market oriented and less is planned. But while mana­
gers' responsibilities are being increased significantly, improvements 
in autonomy continue to be problematic. Since the enterprise commit­
tee's role goes beyond consultation to having the authority to super­
vise and evaluate the manager, it remains to be seen whether true au­
tonomy is possible. This system may weaken the input of the Party, 
but whether such a committee, which represents several interests, 
would be easier to deal with probably varies from enterprise to enter­
prise.
A more radical form of manager responsibility currently being tried 
is that of leasing state-owned enterprises, or even outright sales of 
property rights, to individuals or groups of individuals who mortgage 
funds in return for the right to run the enterprise as they see fit, tak­
ing the resulting profits or losses. This reform has so far been tried 
primarily in small, service-oriented state enterprises. Leasing avoids 
the potential compromises in autonomy that may result under a su­
pervising committee because there is no such committee. The problem 
of insufficient incentive, i.e., inadequate salary, is also avoided since 
there are fewer restrictions on lessees earning high incomes. But leas­
ing also takes separation of ownership and management one step fur­
ther than the adoption of the more general form of manager responsi­
bility. The Chinese press often has warned of the consequences for 
socialism if leasing were extended to large, important enterprises, 
which would, in their opinion, erode the very foundations of socialist 
ownership "by the whole people."
The probability of either of these manager-responsibility systems 
improving the efficiency of the enterprises is partly dependent on 
what happens when an enterprise loses money and on whether enter­
prises have sources of funds independent of the offices that oversee 
their activities.
Pressures on systems of responsibility are created when enterprises 
do not make profits. To achieve true autonomy and make responsibil­
ity effective, enterprises must be held accountable for losses through 
corrective financing arrangements or bankruptcy. In the past when 
enterprises could not repay loans, or when they were not profitable,
the government budget absorbed the loss. A reform designed to 
lessen this burden on the government was proposed in 1987 to begin 
sometime in 1988. This reform, referred to as “double accounting," 
would explicitly identify sources and uses of funds as state funds or 
enterprise funds. Then, if an enterprise incurred a loss with the state, 
it would be required to use its other funds to repay that loss. In this 
way an enterprise incurring losses in its transactions with the state 
could not, for example, simultaneously be using its own funds for in­
vestment.
If an enterprise continues to lose money, then bankruptcy is the 
next logical step. If there is no possibility of failure, then managers 
know that even if losses persist, government funds always will come 
to the rescue. But bankruptcy is an alien concept in a socialist econ­
omy where enterprises are publicly owned. Even if bankruptcy is 
written into law, the experience of other socialist economies suggest 
that it will be seldom used. The costs of unemployment, disillusioned 
workers, and idle equipment are just too great. Many in China argue 
that at the very least a welfare or unemployment benefit system is 
needed before bankruptcy can be taken seriously.
Another proposed reform that would provide an alternative source 
of funds for enterprises is the establishment of a capital-construction, 
or investment, fund. This fund would be for investment projects 
other than major, long-term state projects covered by planned invest­
ment. How this fund would actually work is still vague at this point, 
but the principle appears to be one of instituting a central source of 
funding, other than bank loans, for small and medium-size projects. 
The reliance on bank loans for these types of projects has resulted in 
an over-issuance of credit. Through centralization, the fund would be 
less vulnerable to local interests and could better control credit expan­
sion. The fund would also coordinate requests for investment to avoid 
duplication of investment projects within localities and to aid bal­
anced development among the sectors of the economy. The imple­
mentation of this type of fund would weaken the connection between 
enterprises and the specialized ministries and local officials upon 
which the enterprises have been fairly dependent for investment 
funds as well as for allocations of inputs. This change would be par­
ticularly helpful to enterprise associations, which are groups of enter­
prises whose members belong to different administrative levels and 
geographic areas. Associations do not directly benefit any one locality, 
a fact that now weakens their ability to gain access to loans, inputs, 
and markets. Along these lines, the central government announced in 
October that it would begin distributing funds for research in technol- 
ogy development directly from the State Science and Technology
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Commission to enterprises and individuals instead of giving these 
funds to ministries and local officials to disperse.
Another source of funds affected by the separation of ownership 
and management is the issuance of bonds or the selling of shares in 
an enterprise. Through such equity sales the buyers are actually ac­
quiring assets, or claims on assets, that they and the rest of the public 
already technically own. This problem does not arise with collective 
enterprises, and to date equity sales have been more common in the 
collective sector. Nonetheless, state-enterprise issues occurred 
throughout 1987, and at the Thirteenth Party Congress Zhao Ziyang 
reaffirmed that this practice would continue on a trial basis. The exist­
ing stock market is far from a daily operation, and only four official is­
sues of state-enterprise stocks have been made since 1985. However, 
this underestimates the number of enterprises involved in issuing 
stocks and bonds. Reportedly, in Shanghai alone, over 1,500 enter­
prises have raised funds in this way. Regulations concerning issues 
are in effect, including the percentage of the capital stock value that 
can be sold, but private individuals as well as other enterprises are al­
lowed to purchase these assets.
Land sales have also occurred. In September the Special Economic 
Zone of Shenzhen held its first land auction, offering land-use rights 
for 50 years, with transfer and mortgage rights included.5 Shanghai is 
interested in using such sales to raise capital for development, but so 
far this special right permitted in Shenzhen has not been extended to 
other parts of China. At the same time, Chinese enterprises that want 
to expand their production facilities often seek out rural areas in 
which to build factories or take over and convert existing facilities. 
Rural communities receive some financial return for allowing enter­
prises use of the land. Economic concerns aside, these practices chal­
lenge established notions about socialist state ownership and control 
of valuable resources such as land; in principle land sales and leasing 
are forbidden by the constitution. How widespread these practices be­
come therefore will depend in part on whether they can be reconciled 
with the theory of socialism.
Price and Tax Reform
Many analysts believe that the key to the success of China's eco­
nomic reform program is price reform. For example, since the profit 
level of an enterprise is directly influenced by prices, unless relative 
prices reflect production costs and user demands, enterprise-
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responsibility systems will be ineffective in producing a more efficient 
use of resources. In fact, increased responsibility may only exacerbate 
the problems that may attend true decentralization of production and 
investment decisions. However, if price reform were instituted, 
thereby radically changing relative prices throughout the economy, it 
would affect income distribution throughout the economy in a way 
that could upset the political status quo. The daunting complications 
of working out a smooth transition have left price reform primarily in 
the realm of study rather than official implementation.
Meanwhile, changes in relative prices are occurring as the propor­
tion of output produced for the plan and sold to the government falls. 
While the price of output bought by the state is fixed, output pro­
duced beyond this, or commodities that are no longer part of the 
plan, can be sold at negotiated or market prices. Depending on sup­
ply and demand, these prices could be higher or lower than state 
prices. The tendency, however, has been for prices to rise, contribut­
ing to rises in the average price level. Whenever the rate of inflation 
rises, pressure to control prices emerges in conjunction with a rever­
sion to rationing.
Although the price issue is politically sensitive, price reform per se 
is apparently not being blamed for the current round of inflation. A 
new study on a possible next step in price reform was released in Oc­
tober 1987, although no date for implementation was mentioned. Un­
der this proposed system, actual prices would not be affected directly. 
Instead, internal accounting prices, or "policy prices," would be es­
tablished according to estimates of relative resource scarcities done by 
the United Nations and the World Bank. These policy prices would 
then be used by banks and officials of the Ministry of Finance, and 
presumably by the proposed construction fund, to rank investment 
projects and to decide appropriate tax rates. Policy prices would also 
be used by enterprises to assess the economic feasibility of projects 
and to measure progress toward improving productivity. Since part of 
China's investment problem is created by misaligned prices that can 
encourage investment in the wrong sectors—for example, in artifi­
cially high-profit breweries instead of low-profit energy—use of these 
internal prices would be an immense help. The success of using such 
internal prices, however, would depend on enterprises believing that 
actual prices would eventually move in the direction of the policy 
prices. There would also have to be sufficient means to control invest­
ment costs by delaying investment in projects for which, using the 
policy prices, the cost was too great until such time as the policy and 
market prices converged.
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A change in the investment tax has been proposed to help control 
investment until investment costs accurately reflect resource costs. 
There has been a 10 percent tax on investment since 1983, but this tax 
was applicable only to investment of funds allocated through the state 
budget and from bank loans. Local government investment and 
projects funded by non-budgetary enterprise funds were exempt. 
Changes will be instituted in 1988 to raise the price to enterprises of 
non-planned investment. This will decrease over-investment caused 
by the availability of funds at artificially low costs without having to 
rely solely on an approval process. Beginning in 1988 investment will 
be subject to three tax rates of 10, 20, and 30 percent, applicable to all 
types of investment funds except key projects approved by the central 
government. Priority projects such as technological improvement will 
be subject to the lowest tax, and “nonproductive" projects such as 
hotels and office buildings will be taxed at the maximum rate.
International Trade and Investment
For the last several years China has imposed strict controls on im­
ports in order to decrease its trade deficit. In 1985 the trade deficit 
was $14.9 billion, and in 1986 it improved only slightly to $12 billion. 
In 1987 very strict import controls were continued and were even ex­
tended to important capital goods, which no doubt added to inflation­
ary pressures as enterprises attempted to find substitutes where pos­
sible. However, these controls led to an overall decrease in imports. 
Simultaneously, exports were promoted. In the first nine months of 
1987 exports increased 23.9 percent over the same period of 1986. 
China has also been quite successful in altering the composition of its 
exports away from raw materials and processing to high value-added 
goods such as footwear, toys, sporting goods, and mechanical and 
electrical goods.6
China's successful export promotion, however, has come at a price 
to the national budget in the form of export subsidies. As this is not 
sustainable, and as China prefers to maintain a near balance in trade, 
new proposals to reform the trading system were released in 1987. In 
the past, decentralization of international trading and control of for­
eign exchange resulted in rapid increases and duplication of imports 
which worsened the trade deficit. This time the thrust is to coordinate 
enterprises within the same industry to prevent price-cutting competi­
tion between them and to pool their knowledge and resources to help 
them crack foreign markets. A group of enterprises that trade in light
6 Cliinn Business Review, March-April 1987, p. 30.
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industrial goods, handicrafts, and garments will be selected to experi­
ment with a responsibility system in trading. They will be given the 
right to retain foreign exchange as a reward for increasing exports and 
profits. In order to encourage exports of highly processed goods, the 
percentage of foreign exchange that can be retained by the enterprise 
will be higher when the level of processing involved is higher. Tar­
geted enterprises also will receive some state funding to upgrade facil­
ities and will receive priority with respect to needed inputs.
After a major decline in 1986 foreign investment in China re­
bounded in 1987. In the first half of the year 738 joint-venture con­
tracts were signed, representing a 30.4 percent increase over the same 
period of 1986. Actual investment in the first six months was $500 
million, an increase of 14.5 percent. Since 1979 contracts worth $17.1 
billion have been signed, and actual foreign investment has reached 
about $5 billion. In addition, off-shore oil contracts worth $2.86 billion 
have been signed; service and engineering contracts currently total 
$6.37 billion; and loans for $20.7 billion have been made for construc­
tion of industrial and infrastructure projects.
Several changes were implemented in 1987 to help foreigners do 
business in China. First, the tax on wage and salary income earned by 
individual foreigners in China was reduced by 50 percent. Second, to 
help mediate when problems arise, the State Economic Commission 
set up the Coordinating Center for Business Co-operation. It is un­
clear how supportive or efficient the center will prove to be, but per­
haps its very existence will lend credence to complaints filed by for­
eign companies. Up until now, if foreign companies felt contracts had 
been misinterpreted or broken, they had little recourse but to threaten 
lawsuits, which were ineffective given China's nearly nonexistent le­
gal system. Furthermore, with no specified part of the bureaucracy 
taking responsibility for such problems, their Chinese counterparts 
had little reason to fear reprisal. Third, a new Trust and Investment 
Corporation, technically falling under the jurisdiction of the People's 
Bank of China, was established by the Ministry of Foreign Economic 
Relations and Trade. This corporation has a sizable capital base and 
will deal with foreign-exchange investments and loans.
Evaluation: Future Prospects for Raising Living Standards
Despite uncertainties concerning the socialist nature of some of 
China's reforms and macro imbalances, household income and con­
sumption levels have clearly risen. Household surveys periodically 
carried out by various Chinese research groups give some indication 
of the improvements in income that have occurred since the reform
program began. One survey covering 66,000 rural households in 846 
counties found that in 1978, 33.3 percent of households earned less 
than 100 yuan in annual net income per person, while in 1986 this 
percentage had dropped to 1.1 percent. In 1978, 2.4 percent of the 
households in this survey earned more than 300 yuan per person in 
net annual income, and by 1986 this percentage had increased to 66.9 
percent. Another survey found that in urban areas in 1981, 6.5 per­
cent of the households earned 60 yuan per person per month, or 720 
yuan per capita annually, while in 1986 this percentage had increased 
to 63.4 percent. Along with improvements in income, there is ample 
evidence of improved consumption levels as households increasingly 
desire high-quality and expensive goods. Rising rates of saving indi­
cate that people willingly wait to purchase the high-quality goods 
they desire.
These increases in living standards have contributed to widespread 
support for the reform program. Several trends, however, may be 
working against future increases in living standards in both rural and 
urban areas, and without those increases support for the reforms 
could erode.
One such trend in rural areas is that the prices of inputs such as 
fertilizer are rising at the same time that growth in agricultural output 
is slowing compared with the initial years of rural reform. Some ana­
lysts in China feel agricultural purchasing prices should again be 
raised to compensate for these cost increases and to serve as incen­
tives to increase production. Others disagree, arguing that after a 
number of years of budget deficits, the government cannot afford 
higher purchasing prices. This group tends to favor decontrolling dis­
tribution of agricultural products altogether, including grain, and let­
ting the market determine the price. Even if prices rise enough to 
stimulate incentives to produce more, the question for agricultural 
workers in China will be how to raise output while keeping expenses 
at a minimum. For example, are there further gains to be made from 
reorganizing production? Will more use of fertilizer make a difference? 
And what kinds of long-term investments should be made? Chinese 
analysts agree that rural reform needs to be revitalized in 1988, but a 
consensus is lacking on what should happen next.
Second, working against the future standard of living in China are 
trends in population and education. China's rate of population 
growth is again on the rise, especially in rural areas. Between 1985 
and 1986 the birth rate increased from 17.8 per thousand to 20.8 per 
thousand. Stricter enforcement of the one-child-per-family policy has 
been announced for 1988, but progress will not be easy. The success 
of the rural reforms themselves is partly to blame for the slippage in
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population control. The prospects of higher income through higher 
production, and consequently the desirability of having more family 
members to help, have outweighed the social or financial costs of ig­
noring the population policy. For similar reasons, increasing numbers 
of rural children are not finishing even the minimum of education re­
quired. While the extra family workers are contributing to current in­
creases in family income, these trends may have negative effects on 
increases in average family income in the future if, as some studies 
indicate, education levels correlate to improved skills and lower fertil­
ity.
Third, the problem of inflation eroding increases in living standards 
is particularly relevant for urban residents. As noted earlier, inflation 
in the cities has been consistently higher than the average; it was as 
high as 35 percent with respect to food prices in some areas during 
1987. Because average wages have been increasing, inflation will be at 
least affordable for some, but others will not be so fortunate. Wage in­
creases vary by work unit depending on whether or not the enter­
prise is profitable, and although they are high in some cases when 
bonuses are included, they rarely match the 35 percent inflation rate. 
Wages of workers who have temporary contracts with enterprises are 
not likely to keep up with inflation unless a worker has a special skill 
in high demand. Expanding the labor-contract system is part of the 
reform program, which is meant to develop a labor market in China, 
giving both workers and enterprises more choice in employment. The 
trade-off for this flexibility, however, may be decreases in wages, bene­
fits, and job security. If wages of these workers increase slower than 
those of permanent workers, then expanding this system will bring 
down the average wage. Finally, people on fixed incomes will be es­
pecially unhappy with the adverse effects of inflation on their real in­
comes.
A major contributing factor to inflation in urban areas is rising 
housing costs, which are the result of changes in the way housing is 
distributed and managed. Housing costs to consumers have been ex­
tremely low. Monthly rent has been estimated to be less than one 
yuan in some areas, far below the costs of maintenance, let alone the 
costs involved in building new apartments. With reform, rents for ex­
isting housing are to be gradually increased and adjusted to account 
for the amount of floor space; residents will be encouraged to pur­
chase their apartments; and rents or purchase prices for new apart­
ments will reflect the building and maintenance costs. While these 
proposals are designed to deal with the serious housing shortage, 
they will also lead to substantial increases in monthly expenses for ur­
ban residents.
So while individuals have seen impressive increases in their in­
comes with reform, further increases in living standards are likely to 
be more modest. In itself this need not weaken the momentum for re­
form, for there is still no comparison with the pre-reform period 
when wages stagnated, but efforts to raise public understanding con­
cerning these adverse trends will become increasingly necessary.
Issues concerning income distribution have also created some con­
fusion. Although prosperity was not the norm before 1979, austerity 
created relatively equal income distribution. Since 1979 Party and gov­
ernment officials have condoned less equal distribution, in part to in­
troduce material incentives into the system and in part because this 
was inevitable once reforms began. Unequal income distribution is 
nonetheless a sensitive issue. This is especially true if some people's 
prosperity is due to unearned income from owning assets, which 
compromises the socialist principle of “to each according to his work" 
and gives those who are less prosperous a legitimate complaint.
The government position on income distribution has been to accept 
worsening inequalities as long as incomes are earned legally. A hier­
archy of wages is maintained; for example, managers earn more than 
the workers they supervise. The government has also been concerned 
about the low incomes of those who live in China's northwest and 
southwest, where the land is barren and the climate is difficult. Per 
capita annual average income in these areas is estimated at less than 
200 yuan ($54), compared with an annual average of 424 yuan ($114) 
in other rural areas and 1,600 yuan ($430) for workers and staff in no- 
nagricultural jobs. Some of the government's efforts to improve the 
incomes of these people include moving them to more hospitable en­
virons, supplying subsidized loans to develop local employment op­
portunities, and seeking additional aid specifically for the poorest ar­
eas from international agencies like the World Bank.
Conclusion
After much uncertainty with respect to both the future of China's 
reform program and its ability to control runaway growth, 1987 ended 
on a surprisingly positive note. The Thirteenth Party Congress pro­
claimed China to be in the "primary stage of socialism," allowing flex­
ible interpretations of reforms, and labeled 1988 the beginning of the 
third stage of reform. Despite problems due to the "trial and stage" 
approach to implementation, the current and proposed reforms pri­
marily reinforce each other and attempt to confront the problems at 
hand. For example, enterprises need access to funds to achieve the 
much-sought-after autonomy; the stock and bond markets and the
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proposed construction fund address this concern. At the same time, 
central officials need some way to influence the use of such funds; 
both the extension of the investment tax, which discourages invest­
ment by raising its cost, and the use of the proposed "policy prices" 
as the basis for project selection address this issue.
With respect to growth, unreasonably high growth rates occurred 
during 1987 in some sectors but were lower by year's end. The decent 
harvest, an easing of the trade deficit, and equal growth rates in 
heavy and light industry will all help correct demand and supply im­
balances.
Many problems remain, of course, with inflation being one obvious 
reflection of these problems and perhaps also a key obstacle to timely 
implementation of further reform. Concerns over whether or not im­
balances will worsen in 1988 are being expressed by Chinese analysts 
and officials at all levels. Many reforms are still in an experimental, 
trial stage, and it is unclear when, if ever, they will be implemented 
more generally. The bankruptcy law, for example, has not appeared 
lately in official discussions of the future of China's economic reforms, 
and Zhao Ziyang did not mention it in his pivotal speech at the Thir­
teenth Party Congress.
Reflecting concern with rapid, imbalanced growth, plans for 1988 
emphasize results and not speed. Reform work is to focus on improv­
ing investment decisions, input distribution, the international trading 
system, and wage and personnel options in enterprises and in civil 
service. The next step in rural reform is under discussion.
The combination of new political leadership and persistent eco­
nomic problems leaves the Chinese economy in 1988 with a delicate 
balance of high expectations and an uncertain political and economic 
environment. To some extent progress with respect to economic re­
form has been placed on the shoulders of enterprise managers. But in 
any economic system, managers perform least well in uncertainty, 
and in China this is only compounded by the still-vague division of 
authority between managers and the political cadre. Finally, with the 
appointment of Li Peng to replace Zhao Ziyang as acting premier, the 
priorities with respect to reform could change. Li, trained in the So­
viet Union as an engineer and raised in the center of power as Zhou 
Enlai's adopted son, may favor slower implementation of market au­
tonomy and decentralization of enterprises. Reform, both economic 
and political, has been reaffirmed by the Party Congress; how this 
translates into action in 1988 remains to be seen.
